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Abstract The last two decades in the field of artificial intel-
ligence have clearly shown that true intelligence always
requires the interaction of an agent with a real physical and
social environment. The concept of embodiment that has
been introduced to designate the modern approach to de-
signing intelligence has far-reaching implications. Rather
than studying computation alone, we must consider the in-
terplay between morphology, materials, brain (control),
and the environment. A number of case studies are pre-
sented, and it is demonstrated how artificial evolution and
morphogenesis can be used to systematically investigate
this interplay. Taking these ideas into account requires en-
tirely novel ways of thinking, and often leads to surprising
results.
1 Introduction
In the traditional paradigm cognition, or generally intelli-
gence, has been viewed as computation. The last two de-
cades of research in the field have shown the limitations of
this approach: true intelligence always requires the interac-
tion with a real physical and social environment. An analy-
sis of the failures of the traditional approach towards
understanding and designing intelligent systems yields a
fundamental neglect of the system–environment interac-
tion. In contrast to a virtual or formal world (like chess,
logic, or a virtual machine), the real world does not have
precisely defined states; there is always only limited infor-
mation available, there is only partial predictability, the
environment has its own dynamics, and what an agent can
do is not (completely) defined by the current situation. The
interaction with the environment is always mediated by a
physical body, with a particular morphology, i.e., body
shape, and sensors and actuators distributed on the body.
The concept of embodiment that has been introduced
to designate the modern approach to designing intelligence
has far-reaching implications. Rather than studying com-
putation alone, we must consider the interplay between
morphology, materials, brain (control), and the envi-
ronment. These considerations go far beyond the trivial
meaning of embodiment that “intelligence requires a
body.” They not only necessitate the interdisciplinary coop-
eration of computer science, neuroscience, engineering, and
material science, but require entirely novel ways of think-
ing. It is interesting to note that agents do not “get” the
information from the environment, but they have to
actively acquire it through specific kinds of interactions,
so called sensory–motor coordinations, as will be argued
below.
As a first step toward a theory of intelligence based on
the concepts of embodiment, a set of design principles for
intelligent systems has been proposed which can be grouped
into two categories, design procedure principles, and agent
design principles. Examples of the former are “synthetic
methodology,” “time perspectives,” “emergence,” and
“frame of reference,” examples of the latter include “cheap
design,” “ecological balance,” and “sensory–motor coordi-
nation.” Because of their relevance to real-world interac-
tions the focus will be on “cheap design,” “ecological
balance,” and “sensory–motor coordination.”
We start by summarizing the principles. We then pick
out three principles for illustration. We then briefly outline
how to systematically explore the design principles using
artificial evolution and morphogenesis. To conclude, a num-
ber of research challenges and some speculations are pre-
sented. It should be noted that this is not a technical paper
but a conceptual one.
22 Design principles: overview
There are different types of design principles. Some are
concerned with the general “philosophy” of the approach.
We call them “design procedure principles,” as they do not
directly pertain to the design of the agents, but more to the
way of proceeding. Another set of principles deals more
with the actual design of the agent. We use the qualifier
“more” to express the fact that we are often not designing
the agent directly, but rather the initial conditions and the
learning and developmental processes, or the evolutionary
mechanisms and the encoding in the genome, as we will
elaborate later. A first version of the design principles was
published at the 1996 conference on Simulation of Adaptive
Behavior.1 A more elaborate version was published in the
book Understanding Intelligence.2 The current overview will
be very brief as a more extended version is in preparation.3
Table 1 summarizes the design principles.
P-Princ 1: the synthetic methodology principle. The syn-
thetic methodology “understanding by building” implies on
the one hand constructing a model (computer simulation or
robot) of some phenomenon of interest (e.g., how an insect
walks, how a monkey is grasping a banana, or how we
recognize a face in a crowd). On the other hand we want to
abstract general principles (some examples are given be-
low). The term “synthetic methodology” was adopted from
Braitenberg’s seminal book Vehicles: Experiments in Syn-
thetic Psychology.4
P-Princ 2: the principle of emergence. If we are interested
in designing adaptive systems, we should aim for emer-
gence. Strictly speaking, behavior is always emergent, as it
cannot be reduced to internal mechanisms only; it is always
the result of a system–environment interaction. In this
sense, emergence is not all or none, but a matter of degree:
the further removed from the actual behavior the designer
commitments are made, the more we call the resulting be-
havior emergent.
P-Princ 3: the diversity–compliance principle. Intelligent
agents are characterized by the fact that they are on the one
hand exploiting the specifics of the ecological niche, and on
the other by behavioral diversity. In a conversation, we
have to comply with the rules of grammar of the particular
language, but then we can generate an infinite diversity of
sentences. This principle, or trade-off, comes in many varia-
tions in cognitive science, i.e., the plasticity–stability
tradeoff in learning theory,5 assimilation–accommodation
in perception,6 and exploration–exploitation in evolution-
ary theory.7
P-Princ 4: the time perspectives principle. A comprehen-
sive explanation of the behavior of any system must incor-
porate at least three perspectives: (a) state-oriented, i.e., the
“here and now,” (b) learning and development, i.e., the
ontogenetic view, and (c) evolutionary, i.e., the phyloge-
netic perspective.
P-Princ 5: the frame-of-reference principle. There are three
aspects to be distinguished when designing an agent: (a) the
perspective, i.e., are we talking about the world from the
agent’s perspective, or the one of the observer, or the de-
signer?; (b) behavior is not reducible to an internal mecha-
nism; trying to do that would constitute a category error;
and (c) any apparently complex behavior of an agent does
not imply complexity in the underlying mechanism (for
more detail, see Simon8 and Seth9).
A-Princ 1: the three-constituents principle. This very often
ignored principle states that when designing an agent, we
Table 1. Overview of the design principles
Number Name Description
Design procedure principles
P-Princ 1 Synthetic methodology Understanding by building
P-Princ 2 Emergence Systems designed for emergence are more adaptive
P-Princ 3 Diversity-compliance Trade-off between exploiting the givens and generating diversity solved
in interesting ways
P-Princ 4 Time perspectives Three perspectives required: “here and now,” ontogenetic, phylogenetic
P-Princ 5 Frame-of-reference Three aspects must be distinguished: perspective, behavior vs.
mechanisms, complexity
Agent design principles
A-Princ 1 Three constituents Task environment (ecological niche, tasks) and agent must always be
taken into account
A-Princ 2 Complete agent Embodied, autonomous, self-sufficient, situated agents are of interest
A-Princ 3 Parallel, loosely coupled Parallel, asynchronous, partly autonomous processes; largely coupled
processes through interaction with the environment
A-Princ 4 Sensory–motor coordination Behavior sensory–motor coordinated with respect to target; self-
generated sensory stimulation
A-Princ 5 Cheap design Exploitation of niche and interaction; parsimony
A-Princ 6 Redundancy Partial overlap of functionality based on different physical processes
A-Princ 7 Ecological balance Balance in complexity of sensory, motor, and neural systems: task
distribution between morphology, materials, and control
A-Princ 8 Value Driving forces; developmental mechanisms; self-organization
3have to consider three components: (a) the definition of the
ecological niche (the environment), (b) the desired behav-
iors and tasks, and (c) the agent itself. The main point of this
principle is that it would be a fundamental mistake to design
the agent in isolation. This is particularly important because
much can be gained by exploiting the physical and social
environment.
A-Princ 2: the complete agent principle. The agents of in-
terest are autonomous, self-sufficient, embodied, and situ-
ated. This view, although extremely powerful and obvious,
is not very often considered explicitly.
A-Princ 3: the principle of parallel, loosely coupled proces-
ses. Intelligence is emergent from an agent–environment
interaction based on a large number of parallel, loosely
coupled processes that run asynchronously and are con-
nected to the agent’s sensory–motor apparatus.
A-Princ 4: the principle of sensory–motor coordination. All
intelligent behavior (e.g., perception, categorization,
memory) is to be conceived as sensory–motor coordination.
This sensory–motor coordination, in addition to enabling
the agent to interact efficiently with the environment, serves
the purpose of structuring its sensory input. One of the
powerful implications is that the problem of categorization
is greatly simplified through interaction with the real
world because the latter supports the generation of “good”
patterns of sensory stimulation, where “good” means
correlated and stationary (at least for a short period of
time). One of the essential points here is that sensory
stimulation is generated through interaction with the envi-
ronment, which is a physical process, not a computational
one.
A-Princ 5: the principle of cheap design. Designs must be
parsimonious and exploit the physics and the constraints
of the ecological niche. A trivial example is a robot with
wheels which exploits the fact that the ground is mostly flat.
Other examples are given below.
A-Princ 6: the redundancy principle. Agents should be
designed such that there is an overlap of functionality of
the different subsystems. Examples are sensory systems
where, for example, the visual and the haptic systems both
deliver spatial information, but they are based on different
physical processes (electromagnetic waves vs. mechanical
touch).
A-Princ 7: the principle of ecological balance. This prin-
ciple consists of two parts, the first concerns the relation
between the sensory system, the motor system, and neural
control. Given a certain task environment, there has to be a
match in the complexity of the sensory, motor and neural
systems of the agent. The second is about the relation be-
tween morphology, materials, and control. Given a particu-
lar task environment, there is a certain balance or task
distribution between morphology, materials, and control
(e.g., Hara and Pfeifer10 and Pfeifer11). Often, if the mor-
phology and the materials are right, control will be much
cheaper. Since we are dealing with embodied systems, there
will be two dynamics, the physical one, or body dynamics,
and the control, or neural dynamics, that need to be coupled
(e.g., Ishiguro et al.,12).
A-Princ 8: the value principle. This principle is, in essence,
about motivation. It is about why the agent does anything in
the first place. Moreover, a value system tells the agent
whether the result of an action was positive or negative (this
is a very fundamental issue; there is no room for a compre-
hensive discussion here, but for a more detailed description
see Edelman13).
Note that this set of principles by no means is complete.
For example, a set of principles for designing evolutionary
systems is currently under development.
3 Illustrations of embodiment
The following examples are to illustrate that embodiment
has not only physical implications, but also important infor-
mation theoretic ones (concerning neural control).
3.1 The passive dynamic walker, the quadruped “Puppy,”
and the dancing robot “Stumpy”
A passive dynamic walker is a robot (or, if you like, a
mechanical device) capable of walking down an incline
without any actuation and without control: it is “brainless,”
so to speak. In order to achieve this task, the passive dynam-
ics of the robot, its body, and its limbs must be exploited.
This kind of walking is very energy-efficient and there is an
intrinsic naturalness to it. However, its “ecological niche”
(i.e., the environment in which the robot is capable of oper-
ating) is extremely narrow: it only consists of inclines of
certain angles. Energy-efficiency is achieved because in this
approach the robot is, loosely speaking, operated near one
of its Eigenfrequencies. To make this work, a lot of atten-
tion was devoted to morphology and materials. For ex-
ample, the robot is equipped with wide feet of a particular
shape to guide lateral motion, soft heels to reduce instability
at heel strike, counter-swinging arms to negate yaw induced
by leg swinging, and lateral-swinging arms to stabilize side-
to-side lean.14
The quadruped “puppy” (Fig. 1), developed by Fumiya
Iida of the AILab of the University of Zurich, represents
another example of the exploitation of dynamics and of the
interplay of morphology, materials, and control.15,16
The legs perform a simple oscillation movement, but in
the interaction with the environment, through the interplay
of the spring system, the flexible spine (note that the battery
is attached to as elastic spine which provides precisely
the proper weight distribution), and gravity, a natural quad-
ruped gait occurs, sometimes with all four legs off the
ground. The system has self-stabilizing characteristics. It
is interesting to note that the foot–ground contact must
4exhibit little friction in order for this self-stabilization to
work.
For “Stumpy,”17,18 the goal was to generate a large behav-
ioral diversity with as little control as possible. Stumpy’s
lower body is made of an inverted “T” mounted on wide
springy feet (Fig. 2). The upper body is an upright “T”
connected to the lower body by a rotary joint, the “waist”
joint. The horizontal beam on the top is weighted on the
ends to increase its moment of inertia. It is connected to the
vertical beam by a second rotary joint, providing one rota-
tional degree of freedom, in the plane normal to the vertical
beam, the “shoulder” joint. Stumpy’s vertical axis is made
of aluminum, while both its horizontal axes and its feet are
made of oak wood.
Stumpy can locomote in many interesting ways: it can
move forward in a straight or curved line, it has different
gait patterns, it can move sideways, and it can turn on the
spot. Interestingly, this can all be achieved by actuating only
two joints with one degree of freedom. In other words,
control is extremely simple – the robot is virtually “brain-
less.” The reason this works is because the dynamics, given
by its morphology and its materials (elastic, spring-like ma-
terials, the surface properties of the feet), are exploited in
clever ways.
These three case studies illustrate the principles of cheap
design and ecological balance. Loosely speaking, we can say
that the control tasks, i.e., the neural processing, are partly
(or completely in the case of the passive dynamic walker)
taken over by having the proper morphology and the right
materials. Note that cheap design is not restricted to simple
systems: it also applies to humans as highly complex biologi-
cal creatures, as they also exploit the passive forward swing
of the legs when walking.
3.2 Reaching and grasping: the principle of
sensory–motor coordination as a key to higher
levels of intelligence
Let us pursue this idea of exploiting the dynamics a little
further and show how it can be taken into account to design
actual robots. Most robot arms available today work with
rigid materials and electric motors. Natural arms, by con-
trast, are built of muscles, tendons, ligaments, and bones,
materials that are nonrigid to varying degrees. All these
materials have their own intrinsic properties, like mass,
stiffness, elasticity, viscosity, temporal characteristics,
damping, and contraction ratio, to mention but a few. These
l0
l1
l2
Batteries 
l3
l4 
l5 
s0
s1
Fig. 1. The quadruped “puppy.” a Picture of the entire “puppy.” b The spring system in the hind legs. c Diagram showing the joints, servomotor
actuated joints (circles with crosses), and flexible spine (dotted line).
Fig. 2. The dancing, walking, and hop-
ping robot Stumpy. a Photograph of
the robot. b Schematic drawing (for
details, see text)
a,b c
a b
5properties are all exploited in interesting ways in natural
systems. For example, there is a natural position for a hu-
man arm which is determined by its anatomy and by these
properties. Reaching for and grasping an object like a cup
with the right hand is normally done with the palm facing
left, but could also be done (with considerable additional
effort) the other way around. Assume now that the palm of
your right hand is facing right and you let go. Your arm will
immediately turn back into its natural position. This is not
achieved by neural control, but by the properties of the
muscle–tendon system (like a damped spring). Put differ-
ently, the morphology (the anatomy) and the materials pro-
vide physical constraints that make the control problem
much easier – at least for the standard kind of movements.
There is an additional point of central interest. Assume
that you are grasping an object. Through the act of grasping,
a lot of rich sensory stimulation is generated at the finger
tips, and because of the anatomy, the grasped object is
(almost) automatically brought into the range of the visual
system. Grasping, like pointing and reaching, are processes
of sensory–motor coordination. Sensory–motor coordina-
tion is subtended by the anatomic (morphological) and
material properties of the hand–arm–shoulder system, thus
facilitating neural control. The sensory stimulation gener-
ated in this way implies correlations within and between
sensory modalities, which is a prerequisite for developing
higher levels of cognition. In this way, we are beginning to
see how embodiment constitutes a precondition for intelli-
gent behavior. The generation of structured sensory stimu-
lation through physical interaction with the environment
represents a key toward understanding developmental pro-
cesses, as they are fundamental in humanoid robotics.
4 Artificial evolution and morphogenesis
We have postulated and discussed a number of agent design
principles. We also pointed out the principle of emergence.
If we could demonstrate that the agent design principles
would emerge from more fundamental evolutionary pro-
cesses, this would corroborate the principles. As we are
interested in embodied systems, we must define processes
capable of co-evolving morphology, materials, and control.
This can be achieved through artificial evolution with mor-
phogenesis based on genetic regulatory networks. This way,
we can study agent design systematically and observe the
(potential) emergence of agent designs. In order to provide
a feel for the methodology, we are including a paragraph
with a short description of the mechanics of artificial genetic
regulatory networks.
We provide a nontechnical introduction (for details, see,
e.g., Bongard and Pfeifer19 and Bongard20,21). It should be
stressed that although this computational system is biologi-
cally inspired, it does not constitute a biological model.
Rather, it is a system in its own right. Also, when we use
biological terminology, e.g., when we say that “concentra-
tions of transcription factors regulate gene expression,” this
is meant metaphorically.
The basic idea is the following. A genetic algorithm is
extended to include ontogenetic development by growing
agents from genetic regulatory networks. In the example
presented here, agents are tested for how far they can push
a large block (which is why they are called “block pushers”).
Figure 3a shows the physically realistic virtual environment.
The fitness determination is a two-stage process: the agent is
first grown, and is then evaluated in its virtual environment.
Figure 3b illustrates how an agent grows from a single cell
into a multicellular organism.
The algorithm starts with a string of randomly selected
floating point numbers between 0 and 1. A scanning mecha-
nism determines the location of the genes. Each gene con-
sists of six floating point numbers which are the parameters
that evolution can play with. These are explained in Fig. 4.
There are transcription factors that only regulate the activ-
ity of other genes, and there are transcription factors for
morphology and for neuronal growth. Whenever a gene is
“expressed,” it will diffuse a transcription factor into the cell
from a certain diffusion site. The activity of this genetic
regulatory network leads to particular concentrations of the
transcription factors to which the cell is sensitive: whenever
a concentration threshold is exceeded, an action is taken.
For example, the cell may increase or decrease in size, if
it gets too large it will split, the joint angles can be varied,
neurons can be inserted, connections can be added or de-
leted, structures can be duplicated, etc. The growth process
begins with a single unit into which “transcription factors”
are injected (which determines the primary body axis).
Then it is left to the dynamics of the genetic regulatory
network. The resulting phenotype is subsequently tested in
Fig. 3. Example of Bongard’s “block
pusher.” a An evolved agent in its
physically realistic virtual environment.
b The growth phase starting from a
single cell, showing various intermedi-
ate stages (last agent after 500 time-
steps)
a b
6the virtual environment. Over time, agents evolve that are
good at pushing the block.
5 Conclusions: research challenges
Let us conclude by listing a few research challenges. (1) A
theoretical understanding of (intelligent) behavior. In spite
of half a century of research in artificial intelligence, we are
still lacking a profound understanding of the mechanisms of
intelligent behavior. With the set of design principles pro-
vided earlier, we hope to make a pertinent contribution,
however small. At the moment, these principles are qualita-
tive in nature, and a more quantitative formulation will be
required in the future. (2) Achieving higher levels of intel-
ligence through development. We touched only briefly
upon sensory–motor coordination as a principle that is in-
strumental in achieving higher levels of intelligence. The
field of “developmental robotics” capitalizes on this issue,
and we can expect many exciting results from it. However,
the field in its current state is lacking a firm theoretical
foundation. (3) Fully automated design methods (artificial
evolution and morphogenesis). One of the big challenges is
the automation of design. Designing embodied systems pre-
sents an additional challenge, as we need to take into ac-
count the interplay between the environment (physical, but
also social), morphology, materials, and control. (4) Moving
into the real world (evolution, growth, etc.) To date, growth
processes can only be achieved in simulation experiments –
real-world growth processes are only in their very initial
stages in research laboratories, and cannot yet be exploited
for growing sophisticated creatures. This point represents
an enormous challenge and will require many years of basic
research.
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